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THE FUTURE OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE

OWEN D. JONES*
ABSTRACT
I was asked to speculate about where the field of Law and Neuroscience may be ten years from now. In that spirit (and while recognizing that the future rarely complies with our predictions) I attempt
here some extrapolations. I first consider potential advances in the
technologies for monitoring and manipulating brain states, the techniques for analyzing brain data, and the efforts to further integrate
relevant fields. I then consider potential neurolaw developments
relevant to: (1) detecting things law cares about; (2) individualizing
developmental states and brain states; (3) evidence-based legal
reforms; (4) legal decision-making; and (5) brain-brain interfaces.
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INTRODUCTION
The hosts of this Symposium asked presenters to offer their
opinions about what might be happening in Law and Neuroscience
ten years down the road. We must obviously approach the question
with some humility. Because—despite remarkable discoveries in the
brain sciences over the last couple decades—there’s so much more
that we don’t know about the brain than that we do.
So this is a highly fraught exercise. And one that challenges us to
somehow free our imaginations, while keeping our feet planted firmly on the ground. In that spirit, and with full recognition of how
rarely the future chooses to comply with our predictions, I will attempt to extrapolate into this new future, as asked, in a few of the
many important domains of Law and Neuroscience.
Before turning to the future, though, a few words on the past. The
late Margaret Gruter, who founded the Gruter Institute for Law
and Behavioral Research,1 deserves a lot of credit for being—so far
as I am aware—the first person to bring legal scholars, judges, evolutionary biologists, and neuroscientists together systematically.
Margaret believed that the science of animal behavior was relevant
to the science of human behavior, and that—if that were true—it
would inevitably have implications both for brain sciences generally and for law specifically.
My own interests in animal behavior were sparked at a very
young age, by informal observations among woods and lakes, and
also by the fascinating books on animal behavior emerging at the
time. My interests in law sparked later, in college. And I was not yet
aware of Margaret’s efforts when I wrote a college paper combining
those interests on the relevance of behavioral biology to law. I then
went to law school hoping I might be lucky enough to shape an
1. GRUTER INST., http://gruterinstitute.org/ [https://perma.cc/HA7B-EEVR]. Margaret’s
papers are, along with Richard D. Alexander’s, among the earliest known works arguing that
the effects of evolutionary processes on the brain, as revealed in the structure and functioning
of its neurons, are relevant to law. See Margaret Gruter, Law in Sociobiological Perspective,
5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 181 (1977); Margaret Gruter, The Origins of Legal Behavior, 2 J. SOC.
& BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 43 (1979); Richard D. Alexander, Natural Selection and Societal
Laws, in 3 MORALS, SCIENCE, AND SOCIALITY 265 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Daniel
Callahan eds., 1978).
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academic career at that intersection. So I was delighted to learn of
the Gruter Institute and to meet, through it, others with interests
at this same intersection.
Margaret fostered a consistently rich exchange of ideas, typically
in intimate conferences at Squaw Valley, California (many of which
I attended, some of which I co-directed, and all of which I found illuminating). There, among the peaks of the Lake Tahoe region, we’d
give presentations across the disciplinary divides, bat ideas around
for days, and share meals, hikes, questions, and findings together.
As it happens, Stanford biologist and MacArthur Foundation
Fellow Robert Sapolsky (a co-panelist for this Symposium) attended
some of these Gruter Institute events. Which perhaps crucially
influenced his response, years later, to then-President Jonathan
Fanton’s invitation (extended to MacArthur Fellow scientists) for
important “big ideas” that the MacArthur Foundation might consider supporting financially, to help jumpstart.
Sapolsky proposed that the Foundation go big on the intersection
of Law and Neuroscience. And I, having been working at the law/
biology intersection for (at that point) roughly fifteen years, and
having recently begun a neurolaw brain-imaging experiment at
Vanderbilt University with neuroscientist Rene Marois, was asked
to be among the reviewers of the Sapolsky proposal (a fact the
Foundation tells me I’m at liberty to disclose). Apparently enough
of us reviewers were enthusiastic about the importance of aiding the
legal system’s inevitable encounters with neuroscience that the
Foundation decided to devote considerable resources to this nascent
interdisciplinary field.
It would be hard to overstate the importance of the MacArthur
Foundation in stimulating national—and later international—work
at the law/neuroscience intersection. The Foundation made two
major independent, but topically related, investments totaling
roughly fifteen million dollars. The first was in the MacArthur
Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project (Michael Gazzaniga,
director), of which I served as a co-director and later director. The
second was in the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Law and Neuroscience, which I had the honor to design and direct.2
2. For further history of the Foundation’s key role in seeding developments in this field,
of the underlying legal and technological developments helping to drive progress at the
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There isn’t room here to do justice to each individual, each collaborative team, and each larger working group that through hard
and regular work helped develop common concepts and vocabulary,
build bridges, explore implications, discover limitations, pilot
projects, co-design experiments, and co-write and co-publish the
results across the last two decades.3 But it’s fair to say that a great
many prominent scholars, across many of this country’s most
prominent universities, together with a number of accomplished and
deeply thoughtful judges, worked in common enterprise on this
entirely new frontier—which had been occasioned, in part, by the
intersection of law’s perennial questions about responsibility,
veracity, memory, and the like with new brain-imaging technologies
that enabled the noninvasive study of brain function and decisionmaking in human subjects.
Although so much has been accomplished to date, the task assigned to us today (against the background just told) is to think
about the future. To get started, I want to spend a few moments, in
Part I, discussing what I think we’re likely to see coming from the
science side of things in the next ten years. I’ll then offer, in Part II,
some remarks about potential futures in five of the many categories
of contexts in which neuroscience may offer value to the legal
system. They are: (1) detecting things law cares about, (2) individualizing developmental stages and brain states, (3) evidencebased legal reforms, (4) legal decision-making, and (5) brain-brain
interfaces.
I. NEUROSCIENCE
Here I’ll give examples of potential developments of three sorts,
across three Sections. I’ll discuss technologies for monitoring and
manipulating brains, techniques for analyzing data collected from

intersection, and of the growth of the field, see Owen D. Jones & Anthony D. Wagner, Law
and Neuroscience: Progress, Promise, and Pitfalls, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1015
(David Poeppel et al. eds., 6th ed. 2020).
3. For overviews of neurolaw, see id.; OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
(2d ed. 2021); Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in NEUROSCIENCES AND THE
HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES 181 (Antonio M. Battro et al. eds.,
2013).
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and about the brain, and theoretical advances from the continued
integration of relevant fields.4
A. Technologies for Monitoring and Manipulating Brain States
2018 marked a significant achievement in neuroscience, by which
researchers managed to compile an extremely detailed brain map of
every single synapse in the entire brain of a fruitfly.5 Obviously
there is a massive difference in scale between the diminutive weight
of the fruitfly brain, at roughly one-half of one milligram, and the
far larger human brain, averaging about 1.35 kilograms (which is
therefore roughly 2,700,000 times as heavy),6 let alone the even
much larger brains of elephants and, say, sperm whales, at 4 kilograms and 8 kilograms respectively.7
But it does not seem to me at all implausible, given the pace of
past neuroscientific and computational progress, to think that within the next ten years we might achieve the same synaptic mapping
of a human brain. The insights such a map might provide won’t
speak for themselves, of course. But a map of such fine-grained
detail would likely afford us the opportunity to probe those brain
data in ways that could lead to some very significant discoveries.
In addition, the recent and tremendous (and at times shockingly
troublesome8) advances in gene-editing techniques, such as those
4. For background on existing technologies and techniques, written for a legal audience,
see JONES ET AL., supra note 3; Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Science for Lawyers, Judges, and
Litigants (2021) (manuscript in preparation) (on file with authors). For one recent view of the
future of neuroscientific techniques, see MATTHEW COBB, THE IDEA OF THE BRAIN: THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF NEUROSCIENCE (2020). For a view stretching fifty years into the future, see
Cara M. Altimus et al., The Next 50 Years of Neuroscience, 40 J. NEUROSCIENCE 101 (2020).
5. Zhihao Zheng et al., A Complete Electron Microscopy Volume of the Brain of Adult
Drosophila melanogaster, 174 CELL 730 (2018). For an example of subsequent work mapping
circuits in a large part of the fruitfly brain, see Louis K. Scheffer et al., A Connectome and
Analysis of the Adult Drosophila Central Brain, ELIFE (2020), https://elifesciences.org/articles/
57443 [https://perma.cc/R3H7-Y9PL]. The fruitfly brain has roughly 100,000 neurons, whereas
the human brain has roughly 86 billion neurons (that is, 860,000 times as many). Id.
6. On the weights of fruitfly and human brains, respectively, see Warren Burggren et al.,
Metabolic Rate and Hypoxia Tolerance Are Affected by Group Interactions and Sex in the Fruit
Fly (Drosophila Melanogaster): New Data and a Literature Survey, 6 BIOLOGY OPEN 471, 472
(2017); FRANS DE WAAL, ARE WE SMART ENOUGH TO KNOW HOW SMART ANIMALS ARE? 12324 (2016).
7. DE WAAL, supra note 6, at 123.
8. See HENRY T. GREELY, CRISPR PEOPLE: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF EDITING
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using CRISPR, suggest that, across the next ten years, researchers
will start genetically manipulating brain form and function in animal models. To the extent those animal models may be from species
that have close, common evolutionary underpinnings with our own
species, this suggests a tremendous avenue for discovery, some of it
potentially law-relevant, about the human condition. And also about
the extent to which such techniques might someday be used in
humans, to good effect.
With respect to Brain Machine Interfaces, we’ve seen a lot of
development over the last decade in their use in medical contexts,
often with paraplegics. Some techniques implant an array of sensing
electrodes on the surface of the brain—in the area of the motor
cortex, for instance—and connect it to a wireless transmitter, powered by a simple watch battery tucked beneath a flap of scalp skin.9
This enables people to control the movements of a robot, with
remarkably fine precision, simply by manipulating their thoughts
alone.10 I believe we’ll see more widespread use, with finer and finer
sensitivities and controls, in the next ten years.
I also expect considerably expanded use of technologies to monitor
not just the hemodynamic (blood flow) responses in the brain, but
also the deeper brain electrical signals (which are not reliably monitored by electroencephalograph (EEG) scalp monitors) and the
neurotransmitters active between synapses. These latter two capabilities are currently being achieved by Epilepsy Monitoring Units
(EMUs), which are surgically implanted in patients with epilepsy.11
Some of those patients have begun serving as subjects in research
studies. And the ability to supplement fMRI and PET brain imaging
with deep brain monitoring of electrical and neurotransmitter
monitoring promises to enrich our understanding of brain function.

HUMANS (2021) (addressing issues surrounding gene editing, including safety, coercion,
equity, diversity, and enhancement).
9. John P. Donoghue, New Interfaces for the Brain, in NEUROSCIENCES AND THE HUMAN
PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES 287 (Antonio M. Battro et al. eds., 2012).
10. For more in this vein, see Moises Velasquez-Manoff, The Brain Implants That Could
Change Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/opinion/
sunday/brain-machine-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/2WL4-ECDP].
11. See, e.g., Epilepsy Monitoring Unit, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkins
medicine.org/neurology_neurosurgery/centers_clinics/epilepsy/emu.html [https://perma.cc/
P5TM-GCW5].
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These are just some examples of the kinds of technologies in
which I expect there to be significant advances over the next ten
years, flowing from government programs (such as the Obama
White House Brain Initiative12), universities, and private industry.
B. Techniques for Analyzing Brain Data
Of course, not all scientific advances are technological in nature.
Many are methodological. And I anticipate large leaps in methods
used to extract useful patterns and information from the huge
amounts of brain data that brain-imaging techniques collect. And
much of that will come from the continuing and expanding deployment of artificial intelligence techniques, which are themselves
advancing rapidly.
For instance, many teams, including those in the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience13 (hereinafter Research Network), have begun partnering fMRI brain
imaging (which enables inferences on locations and changes in
brain activity, during different tasks, on the bases of changes in
localized blood flow during tasks) with machine-learning algorithms, including multi-voxel pattern analysis. Machine-learning
techniques enable us to ask computer programs to explore the data
and to identify patterns that are both (a) identified faster than
humans would otherwise be able to do (if at all); and (b) identified
by (essentially) asking questions of the data that humans might not
have thought to ask.
The capabilities of partnering brain imaging with artificial intelligence are already impressive. For instance, the technique can
reconstruct, from noninvasively detected changes in localized brain
blood flow, what letters of the alphabet a subject is currently observing, and can even make remarkably good guesses as to the key
features of static images someone is viewing.14 And, beyond that,
12. THE BRAIN INITIATIVE, https://braininitiative.nih.gov [https://perma.cc/BBV4-7JJM].
13. For information, resources, and the online bibliography of all known neurolaw works,
see Law and Neuroscience, MACARTHUR FOUND. RSCH. NETWORK, www.lawneuro.org [https://
perma.cc/U3BG-3XQB]. For an overview of some neurolaw experiments, including those that
partner fMRI with machine-learning algorithms, see Jones & Wagner, supra note 2.
14. See, e.g., Frank Tong & Michael S. Pratte, Decoding Patterns of Human Brain Activity,
63 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 483 (2012).
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some labs have been using the techniques to reconstruct rudimentary video images a subject is watching.15 I have little doubt that
this is all just the beginning for the brain imaging, artificial intelligence partnership.
C. Theoretical Advances from Further Integrating Relevant Fields
Universities have divided reality up into pieces, thought to map
onto departmental fields. Often, this has proved useful. Often, it has
erected large gothic edifices that directly impair progress in understanding what’s what, and why.
Although there have been major calls for increasing interdisciplinarity in order to tackle some of the most difficult or complex
problems in the world, and although there has been some progress,
most people are still trained, promoted, grant-funded, and teaching
within the limited boundaries of one field, which drags an anchor on
advancement.
In the context of something as complicated as understanding the
brain, there have been some major interdisciplinary initiatives
holding great promise. For instance, Clara Wu and Joe Tsai have
helped Stanford and Yale—in their respective Wu Tsai Institutes16—to make massive moves into this interdisciplinary space on
human cognition. The Institutes will pull together the fields of
psychology, biology, computation, and a wide variety of others.
On the path toward an even larger transdisciplinary integration
of brain sciences, I particularly hope the next ten years will begin
bringing together two fields of behavioral biology—neuroscience and
evolutionary biology—that at present operate almost entirely
independently. Fundamentally, there are different but entirely

15. See, e.g., Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain
Activity Evoked by Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641 (2011). Beyond that, at least
one lab has been working to decode words from thoughts. See Chris Bourn, The Billionaire,
the Pig and the Future of Neuroscience, SLOW JOURNALISM (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.slowjournalism.com/from-the-archive/the-billionaire-the-pig-and-the-future-of-neuroscience
[https://perma.cc/5A8K-6GF7] (reporting on 2015 work to train an algorithm to predict intended words from neural signals associated with thinking that word).
16. Wu Tsai Neurosciences Institute, STAN. UNIV., https://neuroscience.stanford.edu/
[https://perma.cc/5KNE-2FTY]; Wu Tsai Institute, YALE UNIV., https://wti.yale.edu/ [https://
perma.cc/Y62H-TDH2].
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complementary kinds of causes in biology—generally known by
their (admittedly clunky) terms as proximate and ultimate causes.17
Neuroscience today is almost entirely an exploration of proximate
causes—that is, the investigation of how something happens, such
as how it gets started, how it unfolds, what affects its happening,
and what are the consequences.
Evolutionary biology, on the other hand, explores ultimate
causes—that is, why evolutionary processes have left us with the
brains we have, doing what they do, and non-randomly associating
various suites of environmental inputs with behavioral outputs
that tended, on average, to be adaptive in ancestral environments
for those organisms that bore such predispositions.
But just as all species-typical body forms and behaviors must be
understood to have both proximate and ultimate biological causes—
both always simultaneously relevant—so should all brain form and
function be similarly understood.18 There are pathways of knowledge we simply are not exploring when neuroscience and evolutionary biology—focusing on how and why respectively—remain as
siloed and isolated from one another as they, in most respects, are
today.
II. NEUROLAW
Turning next to the projected intersections of neuroscience and
law, over the coming ten years, there are many more potential
topics here than I could cover in a reasonable space.19 So I will only
highlight a few.
17. For discussion of these central concepts, see John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Utility
of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58 (1994); Ernst Mayr, Cause
and Effect in Biology, 134 SCIENCE 1501 (1961).
18. For an exploration of how understanding both proximate and ultimate causation can
be useful to law, see Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 454-57 (2005).
19. Judge Morris Hoffman has made his own useful set of predictions. See Morris B.
Hoffman, Nine Neurolaw Predictions, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 212 (2018). And I likewise
recommend Stephen J. Morse, Neuroethics: Neurolaw, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2017),
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfordhb9780199935314-e-45 [https://perma.cc/6KEH-49CD], for a variety of thoughts about the future
of the field. For questions raised about the future implications of neurolaw, topically, see
JONES ET AL., supra note 3.
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Here I’ll give examples of potential Law and Neuroscience developments of five sorts. Across five Sections I’ll discuss detecting
things law cares about, individualizing developmental stages and
brain states, evidence-based legal reforms, legal decision-making,
and brain-brain interfaces.
A. Detecting Things Law Cares About
I think the next ten years will reveal major progress in the ability
of neuroscientific technologies and techniques to detect things that
law cares about. Here are four brief examples.
1. Detecting Brain Injuries
We have come a long way from the days when brain injuries were
most indicated, and most reliably, by fractured skulls or penetrated
brain cases. We now know, and can often demonstrate, that the
brain can be seriously injured—for instance by major blows, by repetitive minor blows, or by severe experiential traumas—even when
the skull remains intact.20
I expect some neuroscientific advances over the next ten years
will increasingly aid the legal system in understanding how to investigate, demonstrate, quantify, and anticipate projected recoveries
(if any) from, and implications of, various injuries to a brain’s
function, beyond similar insights into injuries to a brain’s structure
(from which, in part, functional deficits are often deduced and investigated). In suitable circumstances, these could be relevant to the
domains of torts, disability benefits, contracts, and criminal law, as
well as estate law, among others.
2. Detecting, Validating, and Measuring Pain
In his majority opinion, in Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equipment Co., Judge Sutin wrote, “[n]o one can measure another’s pain
and suffering; only the person suffering knows how much he or she
is suffering.”21
20. See JONES ET AL., supra note 3, at 347-96.
21. 604 P.2d 823, 833 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
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As a consequence, legal battles over the existence and amount of
pain remain, so far, inevitable—precisely because there historically
has been so little objective and reliable evidence on which to make
a factual finding. As Professor Hank Greely has noted:
Hundreds of thousands of legal proceedings each year in the
United States turn on the existence and extent of someone’s
(usually a plaintiff ’s or claimant’s) pain. Sometimes those are
personal injury cases, in which plaintiffs seek damages for their
“pain and suffering” for the past, present, and predictably future
in the aftermath of accidents. Most of them are actually disability cases, brought under federal or state disability schemes, or
against private disability insurers. Although the technical question in those cases is not pain per se, it is quite often a question
as to whether the claimants’ pains are so great as to prevent
them from working.22

Against this background, there has been some really interesting
work in the area of pain detection over the last ten years.23 As you
22. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience, Mindreading, and the Courts: The Example of Pain,
18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 171, 178 (2015) (footnotes omitted). As Professor Amanda
Pustilnik has noted, the challenge of dealing with pain, legally, is compounded by the frequent
conflation of chronic and acute pain. See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Legal Evidence of Subjective
States: A Brain-Based Model of Chronic Pain Increases Accuracy and Fairness in Law, 25
HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 279, 282-83 (2017). And, further, the law has made a bit of a mess in
drawing distinctions, as when enforcing insurance policies that are drafted this way, between
“bodily” injuries and “mental” injuries—as if mental injuries exist someplace other than the
brain, and the brain exists in some non-“bodily” location. Or when drawing the distinction
explicitly, such as in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 4 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 2005), which argues for maintaining the distinction because
there should be “more restrictive rules for recovery for emotional harm ... [given that] the
existence and severity of emotional harm is usually dependent upon the report of the person
suffering it or symptoms that are capable of manipulation or multiple explanations.”
For discussion of how such dualism is—while legally maintainable as a fiction—untenable
as a matter of neuroscience, see Francis X. Shen, Sentencing Enhancement and the Crime
Victim’s Brain, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 418-21 (2014); Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and
Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 978 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Maite M. van der Miesen et al., Neuroimaging-Based Biomarkers for Pain:
State of the Field and Current Directions, 4 PAIN REPS. 751 (2019); Sean Mackey et al.,
Neuroimaging-Based Pain Biomarkers: Definitions, Clinical and Research Applications, and
Evaluation Frameworks to Achieve Personalized Pain Medicine, 4 PAIN REPS. 762 (2019);
Karen D. Davis, Introduction to a Special Issue on Innovations and Controversies in Brain
Imaging of Pain: Methods and Interpretations, 4 PAIN REPS. 771 (2019); Karen D. Davis et
al., Brain Imaging Tests for Chronic Pain: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues and
Recommendations, 13 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 624 (2017); Joyce T. Da Silva & David A.
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may imagine, the existence and amount of pain is very difficult to
investigate.24 But I have been impressed with some of the work.
It may come to pass that over the next ten years we will be able
to distinguish, with some reasonable accuracy and reliability, between people in pain and people not in pain. We might also,
although this is even more speculative, have developed some gross
or relative measures of how much pain those in pain are in.
That could have a transformative effect on how some tort and
disability claims unfold. And I would expect that such technologies
and techniques would come quickly before courts on evidentiary
motions, the results of which may bring some of this evidence, in
some contexts, to be weighed in the balance during various judicial
and administrative decisions.
3. Detecting Additional Biomarkers Relevant to Assessments
of Future Recidivism
Parole determinations often hinge on necessarily imperfect predictions about future dangerousness and risks of recidivism.
Anything that improves the predictive power of such actuarial
decisions warrants close consideration. And one potential development over the next ten years will likely be some important additions
Seminowicz, Neuroimaging of Pain in Animal Models: A Review of Recent Literature, 4 PAIN
REPS. 732 (2019); Irene Tracey & Anthony Dickenson, SnapShot: Pain Perception, 148 CELL
1308 (2012); Naomi I. Eisenberger, The Pain of Social Disconnection: Examining the Shared
Neural Underpinnings of Physical and Social Pain, 13 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 421
(2012); R. Peyron et al., Functional Imaging of Brain Responses to Pain: A Review and MetaAnalysis, 30 NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC CLINIQUE 263 (2000); Justin E. Brown et al., Towards a
Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful
from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, 6 PLOS ONE 24124 (2011); Massieh Moayedi et al.,
Pain Neuroimaging in Humans: A Primer for Beginners and Non-Imagers, 19 J. PAIN 961
(2018).
For legal perspectives on pain detection, see Pustilnik, supra note 22; A.C. Pustilnik,
Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Pain Neuroimaging Can Inform the Law, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 1099 (2015); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging
Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012); Adam Kolber, Pain
Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Adam J.
Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011); Brady Somers,
Neuroimaging Evidence: A Solution to the Problem of Proving Pain and Suffering?, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1391 (2016).
24. Even defining pain has proved challenging. See generally NAT’L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE, PAIN: HOPE THROUGH RESEARCH (2020).
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to the existing literature on brain biomarkers correlating positively
or negatively with probabilities of rearrest (as a very conservative
measure of recidivism, since it’s very difficult to know with reasonable precision the rate of recidivism by individuals who are never
apprehended).
One interesting study by neuroscientists Eyal Aharoni, Kent
Kiehl, and colleagues, first scanned ninety-six prisoner subjects in
a mobile MRI, within prison boundaries, during an impulse control
decision-making task, and then followed the rearrest records of
those subjects.25 Fifty-three percent had been rearrested for a crime
within four years of release.26
When the neuroscientists explored the relationships between
brain features and function on one hand, and the probabilities of
subsequent rearrests on the other, they found something interesting
about the relative amounts of activity in the anterior cingulate of
subject brains (a region already believed in the neuroscience
community to be involved in inhibiting undesirable behavior).
Specifically, “[t]he odds that an offender with relatively low anterior
cingulate activity would be rearrested were approximately double
that of an offender with high activity in this region, holding constant other observed risk factors.”27
In a subsequent paper, the authors provided additional analysis
of their data, comparing the ratio of the true positive fraction to the
false positive fraction, when comparing predictive models that
either did or did not include predictions based on activity in the
anterior cingulate. They found that the relative true positive classification rate was approximately seven percentage points higher
when the model includes the anterior cingulate brain activity data
than when it does not.28
True, this is only an incremental gain. On the other hand, no one
expects brain data—or any other single actuarial element—to predict recidivism perfectly. Progress in predictive ability of actuarial
tools depends on adding and refining factors that move decision
25. See Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS. 6223 (2013).
26. Id. at 6227.
27. Id. at 6223.
28. Eyal Aharoni et al., Predictive Accuracy in the Neuroprediction of Rearrest, 9 SOC.
NEUROSCIENCE 332, 335 (2014).
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makers in the direction of making more accurate predictors, under
conditions of uncertainty, than they would make in the absence of
considering such factors. So the suggestion of these papers, that
brain data can help increase the accuracy of a predictive model,
provides not only a fascinating proof of concept, but also (assuming
replication studies) a positive development of the kind we are likely
to see more of in the next decade.
To be clear, no one is suggesting that the relative amount of
anterior cingulate activity should drive any parole decision, by itself. Nor is anyone suggesting that, prior to offending, people with
low activity there should be treated differently, in the eyes of the
law, than other people who have not offended. The question is
simply whether or not brain data, when added to the mix of factors
already considered during parole decisions, improve predictive accuracy. And the existing studies suggest brain data can do that,
warranting further investigation.
4. Detecting Memories
Memories obviously play key roles in many legal actions, both
civil and criminal. And although psychologists have been able to
learn a tremendous amount about memories generally, the complementary neuroscientific investigation of memory is relatively
young. Still, there have been some remarkable advances, which I
expect will usher in many more, over the next ten years.
For example, although it is not yet widely known and appreciated,
the pairing of fMRI brain data with machine learning algorithms
has enabled researchers to detect—on the basis of brain data
alone—the existence of autobiographical memories.29 Imagine anyone predicting such a thing, say, twenty or more years ago. It would
have seemed entirely far-fetched.
In one project of the Research Network, for instance, a Working
Group on Deception and Recognition, led by Stanford’s Anthony
Wagner, hung small automatically operating cameras around the
necks of students, during their daily activities.30 This provided the

29. See Jesse Rissman et al., Decoding fMRI Signatures of Real-World Autobiographical
Memory Retrieval, 28 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 604 (2016).
30. Id.
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lab with a reasonably reliable record of what visual environments
each student had encountered.
In somewhat simplified summary, the lab then scanned the
brains of subjects who were seeing randomly sequenced photographs
that were always either: (a) from their own cameras (and lives); or
(b) from the cameras of other students. The machine learning
algorithm was then provided with all the brain data from the owncamera stimuli and all the brain data from the others’-cameras
stimuli and then allowed to discover (if you will) on its own what
patterns in the two different sets of brain data reliably distinguished them.
The next step, of course, was to show the algorithm brain data
from that same subject, who now saw a different combination of
photographs (from her own life and others’), without informing the
algorithm which brain data were from subjects seeing which kind of
stimuli. Researchers then tasked the algorithm to make predictions
about whether the brain data collected during observation of a given
photo indicated that the subject was seeing a photo from her own
camera, or from someone else’s.
To the surprise of all of us in the Research Network, as well as in
the lab, the algorithm was able, under some laboratory conditions,
to make that prediction with greater than 90 percent accuracy.
As a proof of concept, this is plainly remarkable, as that kind of
accuracy level is rarely achieved. Equally remarkable is that roughly that same level of accuracy was achieved when the algorithm was
trained up on one person’s brain data, and then asked to make
predictions about whether someone else’s brain data indicated that
they were seeing images from their own autobiographical lives, or
not.31
This suggests there is something broadly generalizable about
how the human brain functions when it recognizes a visual stimulus
as matching an existing memory. This kind of work provides us with
an increasingly deep window into how human memory works. And
although it’s at this point impossible to predict accurately how such
work will intersect with the law’s perennial efforts to assess the

31. Id. at 615 (“The neural signatures of these distinct memory states were sufficiently
consistent across participants to yield comparable accuracy levels even when classifier models were trained and tested on data from different participants.”).
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quality, accuracy, suggestibility, and change of memories, it seems
clear that there will be important points of contact.
B. Individualizing Developmental Stages and Brain States
I think the next ten years will reveal increasing abilities to individualize the relative brain development and brain states of subjects, compared to the reference groups of which that individual is
a part.
True, there is already considerable variability among individuals
in brain shapes and functions. Also true, some very important conceptual work has been done, by a Research Network Working Group
on Inferences from Group Neuroscientific Data, led by now-Chancellor David Faigman of the University of California, Hastings.32
But by suggesting that there will be increasing emphasis on
individuals, I mean to highlight that although most neuroscientific
advances have resulted in findings that generalize to the groups for
which subjects were chosen as representatives, the ability to say
something potentially meaningful about how an individual compares to the average of the groups will increase, as the datasets,
technologies, and techniques grow and improve. And this will have
potential implications for those domains and activities of the legal
system that are more immediately concerned with individuals, as in
a criminal trial, than they are with large social groups, as when
legal policies are being developed.
Here are three examples.
1. Brains of Adolescents and Young Adults
A great deal of work in neuroscience has focused on assessing how
the brain changes as a person ages, with particular attention to the
years just fore and aft of legal majority.33 This makes sense when
32. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL, G2I KNOWLEDGE BRIEF (2016); David L. Faigman
et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
417 (2014); David L. Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific
Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. 859 (2016).
33. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Breiner et al., Combined Effects of Peer Presence, Social Cues, and
Rewards on Cognitive Control in Adolescents, 60 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 292 (2018);
Grace Icenogle et al., Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels Prior to Their
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one is considering legislative policies or judicial doctrines that might
best apply to entire groups of people, such as minors generally.
One context in which this could play out is that neuroscientific
findings might prompt us, on an ongoing basis, to consider whether
there are better places to draw age-related lines, given our existing
values that underlie our existing lines, many of which, as is well
known, turn a juvenile into an adult on her eighteenth birthday.
For instance, there is growing evidence that the human brain
doesn’t really finish its maturation process until people have
reached their twenties.34 Now if we’re fully satisfied that age
eighteen works for the purposes of law, there’s of course no need to
make a change, because facts don’t drive values, and law juggles
more vectors of values than just biological accuracy alone (if at all).
Yet, to the extent the age eighteen threshold reflects in part an implicit assumption that the brain has finished developing by then, we
might, in light of neuroscience, choose to reevaluate the wisdom of
basing policy on that assumption.
Relatedly, findings from neuroscience might prompt us to consider whether there are more lines to be drawn for different
purposes. For instance, a Research Network Working Group on
Adolescent Development, led by Yale neuroscientist BJ Casey,
studied young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.
That team found that under some circumstances (particularly those
involving emotional contexts and observation by peers), young adult
brains and behavior more closely resemble the brains and behavior
of juveniles, while under other circumstances young adult brains
Psychological Maturity: Evidence for a “Maturity Gap” in a Multinational, Cross-Sectional
Sample, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69 (2019); Briana S. Last et al., Childhood Socioeconomic
Status and Executive Function in Childhood and Beyond, 13 PLOS ONE 1 (2018); B.J. Casey
& Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 82
(2013); B.J. Casey et al., Adolescence: What Do Transmission, Transition, and Translation
Have to Do with It?, 67 NEURON REV. 749 (2010); CHARLES A. NELSON ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE
OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN (2006);
Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 69 (2005); Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing
Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 1 (2011); Michael Dreyfuss
et al., Teens Impulsively React Rather than Retreat from Threat, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 220 (2014); Katherine E. Powers et al., Consequences for Peers Differentially Bias
Computations About Risk Across Development, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 671 (2018).
34. See, e.g., Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development
During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8174 (2004).
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and behavior more closely resemble the brains and behavior of older
adults.35 Some argue that this young adulthood reflects a distinct
developmental stage of human development, and that—perhaps—
the law should consider tailoring some justice policies specifically
when young offenders are members of this group.36
The point is not that the law should or shouldn’t make any
change in light of neuroscience. The point is that—depending entirely on what we’re trying to accomplish and why we’ve chosen the
locations for existing lines we’ve drawn—we might wish to consider
new information when thinking about whether there are improvements that might be made, so as to more effectively pursue our
already-existing values.
Which brings me, again, to the question of the next ten years. So
far, we’ve been talking about how the legal system might draw lines
between, and handle, members of different age groups. Yet the direction and pace of advances in neuroscience suggest that, in the
next ten years, we may see an increasingly fine-grained ability to
say that a single individual before the court has a brain that
developmentally is either less physically mature, or alternatively
more physically mature, than is the brain of the average person of
his or her age.
The implications are not immediately obvious. If the person in
question were, say, a young adult with a brain significantly less
developed than others of his or her age, to what extent might society
weigh this in favor of treating that individual, legally, like a juvenile? Alternatively, if the person were a juvenile, with a brain
significantly more developed than others of his or her age, to what
extent might society weigh this in favor of treating that individual,
legally, like an adult?
35. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive
Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCH. SCI. 549 (2016); Marc D. Rudolph
et al., At Risk of Being Risky: The Relationship Between “Brain Age” Under Emotional States
and Risk Preference, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 93 (2017). For discussion,
see Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science,
Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2016); Elizabeth Scott et al.,
Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2018);
Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP.
L. REV. 675 (2016).
36. See, e.g., B.J. Casey et al., HOW SHOULD JUSTICE POLICY TREAT YOUNG OFFENDERS?
(2017). For policy level discussion, see Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile
Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769 (2016).
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Note that I’m not taking a position on this. And that’s not because
I have one and am hiding it. It’s instead because I think a decision
on what the implications should or should not be of being in, say,
the fifth percentile for the brain development of one’s age cohort,
warrants a very careful weighing of a wide swath of important values, the net results of which are not easily predicted in advance.
So we may choose, either legislatively (for example, by prohibiting
neuroscientific evidence of this individualized kind) or judicially (for
example, by allowing such evidence to reach the fact-finder, in the
absence of legislation prohibiting it), to have a legal approach that
reflects either a blanket treatment according to membership within
an age group (which can be thresholded by bright lines) or that
instead reflects a narrowly tailored set of factors to be considered,
according to which legal treatment could vary. Either way, this
strikes me as an arena that will be fraught with good intentions
that can cut in opposite directions, which recommends deploying our
best and most carefully considered discourse.
2. Brains in Decline
Of course, the young in society are bookended by the old. And so
we’ll likely see, in the next decade, similar developments and issues
with respect to old age and dementia (at any age).37
We’ll likely be seeing data that provide more functional indicators
and additional structural biomarkers of cognitive decline and
cognitive ability. And some of these will be relevant to legal determinations (particularly as maximum ages and average ages in society
increase) for deciding such things as capacity and competence of
individuals before the court.38 And the same issues with respect to
legal treatments of groups and legal treatments of individuals will
inhere here, as with adolescents and young adults.

37. For recent overviews, see generally THE AGING BRAIN: FUNCTIONAL ADAPTATION
ACROSS ADULTHOOD (Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin ed., 2019); Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin &
Brian Knutson, Decision Making in the Ageing Brain: Changes in Affective and Motivational
Circuits, 16 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 278 (2015).
38. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Aging in the 21st Century: Using Neuroscience to Assess
Competency in Guardianships, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 735. For an examination of the potential
relevance of neuroscience to judicial age and competence, see Francis X. Shen, Aging Judges,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (2020).
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3. Brains in Drug Addicts
Similarly, I expect we’ll see continuing progress in understanding
how addictive drugs affect brains.39 This may lead to an increasingly
nuanced taxonomy, informed by neuroscience, that correlates different drugs with different group-based prospects for successful
rehabilitation. And, again, we will probably see advances in the
individualized assessment of how addiction is affecting the brains
of particular addicts. And this, combined with other factors in an individual’s circumstances, might yield improved actuarial estimates
for the rehabilitation of individuals who have run afoul of the legal
system—and, ideally, improved ability to make treatments available
to addicts before they wind up in the criminal justice system.
There has also been some interesting work using transcranial,
noninvasive, magnetic pulses to loosen the grip of various illegal
drugs on the brain.40 Assuming that work continues to show promise, we can imagine some serious discussions over the next decade,
in light of our collective values and cost/benefit analyses, about
whether such techniques can and should be made a condition of a
probation or parole, for example.
C. Evidence-Based Legal Reform
Another context in which there may well be significant contributions over the next decade involves the accumulation of neuroscientific evidence that could inform potential reform. The examples
given in the last Section are also examples of this context as well.
But, more specifically, I am in this Section considering the extent to
which discoveries from neuroscience may either buttress or
39. For perspectives on the effects of addiction on the brain, see Nora D. Volkow et al.,
Addiction Circuitry in the Human Brain, 52 ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 321
(2012); Nora D. Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of
Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363 (2016); CARLTON K. ERICKSON, THE SCIENCE OF
ADDICTION: FROM NEUROBIOLOGY TO TREATMENT (2007); P. Read Montague, The Freedom to
Choose and Drug Addiction, in 4 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 279 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2014); NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS,
AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION (2014); Antonio Verdejo-Garcia et al., A Roadmap
for Integrating Neuroscience into Addiction Treatment: A Consensus of the Neuroscience
Interest Group of the International Society of Addiction Medicine, 10 FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY,
Dec. 2019, at 1.
40. Meredith Wadman, Zapping Cocaine Addiction, 357 SCIENCE 960 (2017).
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challenge longstanding legal assumptions—many of which are,
implicitly, about how people’s brains work.
Here are three examples.
1. Assumptions About Solitary Confinement
Consider that the law implicitly assumes that solitary confinement does not affirmatively and significantly damage the brain. If
it did result in nontrivial damage, that might run afoul of the U.S.
Constitution’s prohibition, in the Eighth Amendment, against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Does it damage the brain? I don’t know. But I suspect that there
is some long-lasting damage.41
I was once given a tour of a maximum security prison by the
state’s Secretary of Corrections (to consider the prospect of a
neuroscience study of effects of incarceration). Along the way, we
encountered a man who had been in solitary confinement for fourteen years. One of the guards indicated that the man was so starved
for interaction that he would, for hours, sit with his back to the door
and his arm elevated so that his fingertips could protrude ever so
slightly through openings in a small metal screen, hoping that one
of the guards would simply touch a fingertip. They often did.
I would love to see a study that could shed light on the effects of
solitary confinement on the brain. Whether there are or are not adverse effects, shouldn’t we as a society want to know if neuroscience
provides one of the tools for learning the facts?
41. For discussion of some of the emerging work in this domain, see Huda Akil, The Brain
in Isolation: A Neuroscientist’s Perspective on Solitary Confinement, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM 199 (Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff
Smith eds., 2020); Jules Lobel & Huda Akil, Law & Neuroscience: The Case of Solitary
Confinement, 147 DAEDALUS 61 (2018); Arielle R. Baskin-Sommers & Karelle Fonteneau,
Correctional Change Through Neuroscience, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (2016); Dana G. Smith,
Neuroscientists Make a Case Against Solitary Confinement, SCI. AM. (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/neuroscientists-make-a-case-against-solitaryconfinement/ [https://perma.cc/92FZ-346N]; Moheb Costandi, Using Neuroscience Evidence to
Argue Against Solitary Confinement, DANA FOUND. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://dana.org/
article/using-neuroscience-evidence-to-argue-against-solitary-confinement/ [https://perma.cc/
HZ6M-EXEQ]; Kayt Sukel, Understanding the Effects of Solitary Confinement on the Brain,
BRAINFACTS.ORG (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.brainfacts.org/neuroscience-in-society/laweconomics-and-ethics/2019/understanding-the-effects-of-solitary-confinement-on-the-brain032119 [https://perma.cc/8NV7-N2GJ].
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2. Assumptions Underlying Evidentiary Rules
If there’s one place the legal system has a lot of implicit reliance
on neurological assumptions, it’s in the evidentiary rules that are
designed to prevent the jury from hearing certain kinds of evidence.
And that’s because the rules are designed to prevent fact-finders
from receiving evidence (into their brains) that could taint their
decision-making process (in their brains).
For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) creates a “present
sense impression” exception to the general rule against admitting
hearsay into evidence. It is based (essentially) on the assumption
that people just aren’t capable of lying quickly. But is that neurological assumption true?
At least one neuroscientist, Christopher Sundby (who is also a
lawyer), has investigated that experimentally, using a technique
known as electroencephalography (more commonly “EEG”) to monitor brain activity during efforts to lie quickly.42 The data, in brief,
suggest that people may engage a different cognitive mechanism
when lying in the moment versus after a delay, something revealed
by changes in working memory load. On one hand, this finding
comports with the assumptions underlying the present sense
impression exception to rules against hearsay evidence, because it
suggests that a third-party observer may be able to detect “tells” of
a contemporaneous lie (for instance, a delayed response occasioned
by increased working memory load), while a skilled cross-examination might be better for detecting a more fully prepared lie. On the
other hand, the data also suggest that the transition from a contemporaneous lie to a prepared one can take place far faster than the
present sense impression rule assumes (less than three seconds).
That proof-of-concept investigation suggests we could usefully
see similar investigations of other evidentiary rule assumptions,
across the coming decade.

42. Christopher Sundby, Does Lying Require More or Less Working Memory and What
Does it Mean for the Legal System? (May 8, 2020) (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University)
(on file with Vanderbilt University Institutional Repository), https://ir.vanderbilt.edu/handle/
1803/16026 [https://perma.cc/86EA-J7M6].
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3. Assumptions About Criminal Mental States
As is well known, criminal convictions typically require both a
bad act and that the act have been performed by someone in one of
several culpable mental states. As a reminder, the widely influential
Model Penal Code (MPC) divides culpable mental states into four
types: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.43 Punishment
amounts, for the very same prohibited action, vary significantly
according to the mental state the defendant is judged to have been
in. In Colorado, for instance, a person who kills someone recklessly
can be sentenced to something as low as probation without prison
time, while a person who killed someone the identical way, but
knowingly, can be sentenced to as many as forty-eight years in
prison.44
Putting someone into a mental state box has enormous consequences. But—and leaving aside for now the evidence suggesting
that jurors are not nearly as reliable in doing this as we’d like45—do
the boxes really exist as the MPC assumes? That is: To what extent
do these four abstract creations, in a neatly labeled taxonomy, map
onto psychological reality?
If the MPC mental states are distinct, then they must reflect
different brain states. So, in order to prevent injustice, don’t we
43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). For
discussion of the MPC’s influence, see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis
in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 69192 (1983).
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103(1)-(3)(a) (2010) defines second degree murder, without
any heat of passion mitigator, as a Class 2 felony. Class 2 felonies ordinarily carry a nonmandatory presumptive sentence of eight to twenty-four years. Id. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A).
Murder is often considered to be a crime of violence, however, a determination that has the
effects of (1) increasing the range to sixteen to forty-eight years; and (2) making a prison
sentence mandatory. Id. § 18-1.3-406(1)(a), (2)(a) (pertaining to murders involving deadly
weapons or to crimes causing serious bodily harm or death). A reckless murder is classified
as manslaughter, however, and carries a nonmandatory sentence of two to six years. Id. § 183-104(1)(A). The statute defines manslaughter as a Class 4 felony. Id. § 18-3-104(2). Class 4
felonies carry a nonmandatory presumptive sentence of between two and six years. Id. § 181.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1). Colorado does not define manslaughter as a crime of violence. Id. § 181.3-406.
45. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011);
Matthew R. Ginther et al., Essay, Decoding Guilty Minds: How Jurors Attribute Knowledge
and Guilt, 71 VAND. L. REV. 241 (2018); Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens
Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (2014).
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need to know whether brain states vary the way the MPC assumes?
The moral legitimacy of the MPC taxonomy depends on whether
those mental states actually correspond to different brain states in
the way the MPC categorization assumes. Otherwise, we are punishing people differently when there is no nonarbitrary basis for
doing so.
Although the MPC is over fifty years old, the empirical basis of its
categories had never been tested until recently (because neuroscientific technologies and techniques to test it only became available relatively recently).
A Research Network team, led by Gideon Yaffe, developed an
fMRI-based brain-scanning task, coupled with a machine learning
algorithm, to see if there were reliable differences in brain activation between subjects in a knowing state of mind and subjects in a
reckless state of mind.46 And the key finding is that, under some
conditions, the algorithm was extremely reliable in identifying when
our subjects were in a knowing frame of mind or a reckless one.
So these results provide the first empirical support for law drawing a line between knowing and reckless criminality, according to
which different punishments will follow. Of course, finding differences between those two brain states doesn’t mean we must
automatically keep the distinction between knowing and reckless in
the MPC. Nor would failure to find brain differences require
abandonment of the distinction. Instead, this proof-of-concept experiment provides a concrete example of how neuroscientific methods
can contribute information relevant to legal policy.47 In this case, a
test of an assumption underlying the policy.
How policymakers choose to weigh that information is a matter
of law and politics, not science, as values, facts, costs, benefits, and
fundamental principles get weighed in the balance. But our
discovery may provide the first step in work, over the next decade
and beyond, toward legally defined mental states that reflect actual
and detectable psychological states, grounded in neural activity
46. See Iris Vilares et al., Predicting the Knowledge-Recklessness Distinction in the Human
Brain, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 3222 (2017). For further discussion and exploration of the
implications of this study, see Owen D. Jones et al., Detecting Mens Rea in the Brain, 169 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1 (2020).
47. Not everyone agrees. See, e.g., Andreas Kuersten & John D. Medaglia, Neuroscience
and the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Categories, 71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2021).
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within the brain. And this illustrates the way that neuroscientific
investigations and evidence can inform, without dictating, intelligent and thoughtful legal reform.
I think there’s also potential, in this vein, to use brain scanning
to help learn about possible origins of other distinctions the law
draws, such as the differences between tort harms and criminal
harms, libel and slander, justification and excuse, and retribution
and deterrence. Similarly, it may prove illuminating to learn more
about how the brain makes legal judgments, distinct from moral
ones. About what happens in the brain when someone is directed to
forget (as when jurors are instructed to disregard what they have
just heard). And about whether there are cross-cultural differences
in brain activation when considering core harms versus noncore
harms.48
D. Legal Decision-Making
We know that few things are more important to the just administration of the legal system than having jurors and judges who can
make unbiased decisions about the cases before them. At the same
time, we know that humans are notoriously prone to a wide variety
of psychological biases.
Until relatively recently, we had no way of knowing—as but one
important part of an inquiry into the nature of law-relevant
decision-making—how human brains go about deciding whether
someone is guilty of a crime, and—if so—how much that person
should be punished. To investigate, a Research Network Working
Group on Intent and Punishment that I headed explored the extent
to which fMRI might illuminate the neural processes underlying
these determinations. These findings could potentially provide valuable information for improving training interventions intended to
help debias them.
Using fMRI brain scans, while subjects were tasked with making
liability and punishment decisions (regarding offenders in hypothetical scenarios), that Working Group identified distinct brain
activity that separately correlate with four key components of those
48. As to the distinction, see Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of
Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1674-75 (2007).
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decisions: (1) assessing harms, (2) discerning mental states in
others, (3) integrating those two pieces of information, and
(4) choosing punishment amounts.49
The ability to noninvasively discover which regions of the brain
are active when, and how, during distinctly different components of
legal decision-making suggests a proof of concept that could be
usefully extended, in the coming years, to other legal decisionmaking inquiries. Ripe for study, for instance, is what effect—if
any—legal training and experience has on brain activity during
various kinds of legal decision-making. I’ll add that our initial foray
into this domain, comparing brain activity of active judges with
matched controls lacking legal training discovered no significant
difference—which is, to my mind, itself an interesting (non)discovery. How does legal education (like all forms of education) change
the brain? Are there differences that correspond with age, sex,
political leanings, or other variables? Are there differences in how
brains are used in different kinds of decisions, such as a disputed
contract interpretation, on one hand, and a rape trial, on the other?
Is the brain activity associated with different outcomes sufficiently
distinct that a machine learning algorithm could accurately classify
the decisional outcome, based on brain data alone? How do different
drugs, that judges and jurors might be taking, affect brain activation in key decision-making regions? How do brain-regions interact
when considering mitigating factors on one hand, and aggravating
factors, on the other?
49. See generally Matthew Ginther et al., Parsing the Behavioral and Brain Mechanisms
of Third-Party Punishment, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9420 (2016). That work built upon studies
by prior, and sometimes differing, configurations of these same co-authors. See Joshua W.
Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930 (2008)
(finding correlations between guilt and punishment decisions and activity in regions commonly associated with analytic, emotional, and theory-of-mind processes); Michael T.
Treadway et al., Corticolimbic Gating of Emotion-Driven Punishment, 17 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 1270 (2014) (finding that theory-of-mind circuitry may either gate or suppress
affective neural responses, tempering the effect of emotion on punishment levels when, for
instance, a perpetrator’s culpability was very low while, at the same time, the harm he caused
was very high); Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., From Blame to Punishment: Disrupting Prefrontal
Cortex Activity Reveals Norm Enforcement Mechanisms, 87 NEURON 1369 (2015) (using
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to test the causal role of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and finding, as predicted, that compared to sham stimulation rTMS
changed the amount that subjects punished protagonists in scenarios without altering how
much they blamed those protagonists).
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E. Brain-Brain Interfaces
I first saw video footage of a brain-robot interface in 2012, when
I was part of a small working group invited to the Vatican by the
Pontifical Academy of Sciences. The group’s charge was to discuss
neuroscience and the human person. And Professor John Donoghue,
a leader in brain-machine interface research, showed an astounding
video.50 In it, a paraplegic woman with a brain implant and a wireless transmitter was able to control a robotic arm and hand with
such precision that, using her mind alone, she could direct it to
locate, grasp, and lift a cup of coffee, bring it to her mouth, tipping
it gently so she could drink, and then returning it to its original
position on a nearby table.51
In light of that experience, I predicted during the instant Symposium, in February of 2021, that within ten years we would see
human brain-to-brain interfaces. Instead, it took negative 1.5 years.
Because, as I recently learned, it had already happened.52 A study
published in mid-2019 demonstrated that three human subjects
could collaborate on a computer task (similar to playing the objectrotating game Tetris) using only brain-to-brain interfaces, using a
combination of EEG and transcranial magnetic stimulation.53
As remarkable as this is, it remains far too rudimentary to communicate complex thoughts clearly. Still—and although I do not
subscribe to precisely the same level of enthusiasm that Elon Musk
has evidenced recently, about the near future of high-capability
brain implants54—it seems entirely reasonable to predict that the

50. Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in NEUROSCIENCES AND THE
HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES 181 (Antonio M. Battro et al. eds.,
2012).
51. This line of research is described in Donoghue, supra note 9.
52. This is, incidentally, a very reliable way of making accurate predictions.
53. Linxing Jiang et al., BrainNet: A Multi-Person Brain-to-Brain Interface for Direct
Collaboration Between Brains, SCI. REPS., Apr. 16, 2019, at 1.
54. Jo Best, Elon Musk's Brain-Computer Startup Is Getting Ready to Blow Your Mind,
ZDNET (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/elon-musks-brain-computer-startup-isgetting-ready-to-blow-your-mind/ [https://perma.cc/CT8J-RST2]. For a description of
Neuralink, the company co-founded by Musk, see Nick Statt, Elon Musk Launches Neuralink,
a Venture to Merge the Human Brain with AI, THE VERGE (Mar. 27, 2017, 4:10 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/27/15077864/elon-musk-neuralink-brain-computer-interfaceai-cyborgs [https://perma.cc/3XB4-7GZJ].
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next decade will bring some (further) advances in brain-to-brain
communications.
And what that inspires us to think about, in advance, is what
legal implications would follow in the wake of increasingly sophisticated brain-to-brain communications. For instance, what would bad
behavior look like in this context? Are there unwelcome forms—or
content—of communications we want to discourage, with narrowly
tailored innovations in tort law? What would constitute the
elements of criminal assault in this context? Could there be successful fraud or misrepresentation claims, based on testimony about
brain-to-brain content? Could someone accept an offer, brain-tobrain, thereby forming a legally enforceable contract? And when two
people are engaged in brain-to-brain communications, could one of
them manifest, without speaking a word, legal consent to sexual
interactions?
CONCLUSION
A symposium on “Imagining the Future of Law and Neuroscience”
provides a valuable exercise in thinking about what new discoveries,
opportunities, and challenges are coming down the pike.
On one hand, I don’t expect any neuroscientific advance will yield
widespread upheaval in the justice system, or its thorough reimagining. On the other hand, I do expect that accelerating progress
in neuroscientific technologies and techniques will continue to bring
information to the legal table—which, after being evaluated for its
reliability, relevance, and utility in light of legal standards and
purposes—may aid, and sometimes challenge, some of the many
important decisions that perpetually confront us.

